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Confronting the Perils of Globalization:
Nicaraguan Banana Workers’ Struggle for Justice
Ethan Grundberg
As our bus finally entered the city of Managua in early April 2005 after a 
10-hour drive from San Salvador, I peered out the window in an effort to locate 
the numerous landmarks that the stout Nicaraguan man sitting next to me was 
describing. We passed the massive statue of Augusto Cesar Sandino that towered 
over the city, the Taiwanese-funded outdoor amphitheater, the giant Plaza de la Fe 
constructed in honor of Pope John Paul II’s 1996 visit, the Rúben Darío National 
Theater, and finally the modest National Assembly. Across the street from the 
Assembly in what normally was a desolate field, thousands of campesinos crouched 
under tents made of black plastic and swung in their brightly colored hammocks 
behind giant banners pleading for the protection of Law 364 and demanding fair 
compensation for exposure to a chemical called Nemagon. Gustavo informed 
me that this was not the first time that the former banana plantation workers had 
marched from their homes in the northwestern region of Chinandega to Managua 
in their long struggle to hold transnational corporations (TNCs) accountable for 
damages resulting from exposure to the toxic chemical. Over the next month and 
a half, I would regularly find myself crouched beneath the sweltering black plastic 
tents listening to the humble workers donning torn plaid shirts and wide-brimmed 
cowboy hats describe how they had managed to forge a popular national movement 
to confront some of the world’s most powerful corporations.
 The movement of former banana plantation workers began in the 1990s as 
a legal struggle for indemnity from TNCs responsible for the production and use of 
Nemagon. After failing to obtain a satisfactory compensation through the courts, 
workers mobilized to pressure the Nicaraguan government to provide the movement 
with legislative support. The workers were successful in their efforts and reissued 
numerous lawsuits against the TNCs in both Nicaraguan and U.S. courts. Though 
these cases are still in trial, the movement has succeeded in obtaining numerous 
material concessions from the government and in rallying popular support in 
Nicaragua.
The experience of the former Nicaraguan banana plantation workers’ 
movement illuminates the paradoxical effects that deepening globalization has had 
on rural workers’ agency. Though there is little agreement among theorists as to 
its precise definition, globalization can be broadly characterized as, “the ways in 
which previously distant parts of the world have become connected in an historically 
unprecedented manner, such that developments in one part of the world are now 
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able to rapidly produce effects on geographically distant localities. This in turn has 
made it possible to begin to imagine the world as a single, global space linked by a 
wide array of technological, economic, social and cultural forces.”1 In the case of 
the Nicaraguan banana workers, globalization has created the conditions in which 
a U.S.-produced toxin can be utilized by TNCs operating in the global south with 
little regard for the human health impacts on a seemingly infinitely replaceable labor 
pool. However, globalization has also ushered in an era in which grassroots labor 
and social justice non-governmental organizations can bridge cultural, physical, and 
logistical barriers to disseminate information and unite geographically disparate 
groups to network for a common cause. The emergence of a “globalization from 
below,” a model of globalization that “supports individuals and groups using 
the new technologies to create a more multicultural, egalitarian, democratic, and 
ecological world,” has enhanced the ability of workers throughout the global south 
to shape international law and confront their systematic exploitation.2 
Though the Nicaraguan banana workers are engaged in such an international 
confrontation, their movement bears little resemblance to popular globalization 
theorists’ vision of the politics of “globalization from below.” Unlike traditional 
social mobilization that has focused on organizing at the national level and engaging 
the nation-state, some theorists argue that “globalization from below” will seek 
“to challenge the power of the global elite by accumulating counter-hegemonic 
forces beyond national and regional borders; to challenge that power from within 
an expanding transnational civil society.”3 The creation of a “global multitude” 
resulting from the demand that “the juridical status of the population be reformed 
in step with the real economic transformations of recent years” is perceived as 
necessary to confront the actors of global capitalism.4 Even the “Lilliputian strategy,” 
which promotes the global coordination of decentralized and autonomous popular 
movements, assumes that social mobilizations will transcend the confines of the 
nation to confront the new global elite.5  This focus on transnationalizing social 
movements seems to be the result of the perceived obsolescence of the nation-state 
as a category of analysis. At a time in which neo-liberalism and global capitalism 
have left skeletal governments in their paths, it is understandable that one would 
argue, “the neo-liberal state retains essential powers to facilitate globalization but it 
loses the ability to harmonize conflicting social interests within a country, to realize 
the historic function of sustaining the internal unity of a nationally conceived 
social formation, and to achieve legitimacy.”6 However, the movement of former 
banana plantation workers in Nicaragua demonstrates a powerful alternative to a 
transnational globalization from below that instead champions the traditional nation-
state and popular nationalism as unifying forces against foreign exploitation. By 
employing innovative tactics that simultaneously appealed to Nicaraguan society 
and pressured elected representatives, the former banana workers were able to 
gain valuable support from the government.  The Nicaraguan government, a clear 
example of a minimalist neo-liberal state, has effectively reasserted its traditional 
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powers of sovereignty and self-determination to challenge the declaration of the 
death of the nation-state. 
The movement’s success in gaining the support of the Nicaraguan 
government can be explained by two factors. First, the decision can be viewed as a 
continuation of Nicaragua’s historical narrative of resistance to foreign intervention.7 
From President Zelaya’s opposition to U.S. pressure to concede territory for 
the construction of an inter-oceanic canal in the early 1900s, to Augusto Cesar 
Sandino’s anti-imperialist campaign against the U.S. Marine occupation from 1927-
1933, to the overthrow of the U.S.-supported Somoza regime by the Sandinistas 
in 1979, many Nicaraguans understand their history as a perpetual quest for self-
determination and against foreign interest.8 The former banana plantation workers 
were able to forcibly associate with this narrative of anti-imperialism to garner 
popular and governmental support.
Part of the workers’ success in associating with Nicaragua’s historical 
narrative was dependent on the second factor: the workers’ effective creation of 
spectacle to assert their citizenship and awaken a latent popular nationalism infused 
with the powerful anti-imperialist ideology of Sandinismo.  As anthropologist 
Daniel Goldstein notes, “The spectacle, then … is also about being seen: calling 
attention to oneself or one’s group by means of public display. This is particularly 
important in urban settings, in which people are marginalized or otherwise rendered 
invisible in the public eye, yet are in close geographical proximity to the loci of 
official power.”9 By physically camping in front of the National Assembly in 
Managua and threatening violent tactics such as self-immolation and crucifixion 
while also carrying the Nicaraguan flag at the head of each march and employing 
the rhetoric of Sandinismo, the banana workers forced themselves into the public 
eye and cultivated a powerful association with Nicaraguan nationalism that 
resonated strongly with much of society. As a result of constructing their movement 
as an embodiment of nationalism, the workers were able to force the government 
to overcome its neo-liberal obsolescence and challenge the hegemony of capital 
in order to maintain popular legitimacy. The struggle of the Nicaraguan banana 
workers confirms Marc Edelman’s assertion that, “even after more than a decade 
of neoliberalism, state agencies remain absolutely central points of reference, foci 
of demands, and sites of struggle, despite the undermining of traditional power 
centers that accompanies economic globalization.”10 From a small field across from 
the National Assembly in Managua, the workers have illustrated the continuing 
potency of popular nationalism in defiance of an increasingly transnational world.
The Beginnings of a Toxic Legacy
U.S. banana businesses began to develop along Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast 
in the mid-1890s in response to efforts by President José Santos Zelaya to attract 
foreign investment and modernize the economy. Between 1909 and 1929, U.S. 
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business investment in Nicaragua doubled to $20 million largely as a result of an 
influx of banana corporations, such as the Cuyamel Fruit Company, Bragmans Bluff 
Lumber Company (a subsidiary of Standard Fruit), and the Bluefields Company. 
However, the banana industry failed to develop as robustly in Nicaragua as it had in 
other Central American countries because of less productive soils, an early outbreak 
of Panama disease, and eventually the socio-political turmoil caused by Augusto 
Sandino’s 1926 rebellion.11 The banana industry slowly withered after the onset 
of the Great Depression until production was so low in 1943 that the government 
neglected to issue a report on the sector.12
 However, Standard Fruit Company renewed its interest in developing a 
banana industry in Nicaragua after a 1944 soil study revealed promising conditions 
on the Pacific coast near Chinandega. Standard’s resident manager H.D. Scott 
obtained a land concession that same year intended for banana production.13 United 
Fruit Company followed Standard’s lead and began operations on the Pacific coast 
in 1960. Although production numbers remained low through the 1960s, Standard 
Fruit maintained significant exports averaging approximately 5.7 million crates 
(about 40 pounds each) per year earning around $5 million USD annually between 
1972 and 1979.14  However, U.S. banana corporations dramatically decreased 
production in Nicaragua in response to the triumph of the Sandinista revolution 
in 1979. Fearful of increasing socio-political instability and disturbed by the 
creation of a nationalized banana company, the Empresa Nicaragüense del Banano 
(BANANIC), Standard Fruit essentially abandoned the country in 1982.15 
 Part of the temporary success that U.S. companies had in reviving the 
Nicaraguan banana industry in the 1960s resulted from their introduction of new 
and more powerful agro-chemicals. Transnational corporations first introduced 
synthetic agro-chemicals to Central America in the 1940s in order to combat pests 
and plant diseases and increase crop yields. The use of such chemicals spread quickly 
over the next several decades, reaching consumption levels of approximately 66 
million pounds per year and constituting a $165 million market in the region in the 
1970s. In Nicaragua, agro-chemicals were first used to help spur the cotton boom 
of the 1940s and ‘50s, but eventually spread to other agricultural crops like sugar 
cane and bananas.16 After containing the massive outbreak of Panama disease in 
the 1940s with the help of synthetic fumigants, banana corporations encountered a 
new infestation in the 1960s: tiny worms called nematodes. The worms fed on the 
roots of banana trees, destroying the plant in the process.17 Standard Fruit Company 
estimated that nematodes had reduced production by as much as 25 to 35 percent 
on its plantations in Costa Rica and Honduras in the late 1960s. In response, the 
corporation began to experiment with a number of nematicides, agro-chemicals that 
control nematode populations, including Nemacur, Terracur, Lannate, and DBCP.18 
Most fruit companies soon settled on DBCP and began using the nematicide on 
banana plantations throughout Latin America.
 DBCP, or 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane, was discovered independently by 
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Shell and Dow Chemical Companies in 1951. Before releasing their products on the 
market, each corporation conducted a series of toxicological tests that exposed lab 
animals to the agro-chemical to determine its potential health impact on humans. 
These tests, conducted from 1954 to 1955, showed that rats exposed to the chemical 
experienced “retarded growth, organ damage, and undersized testes” even at low 
doses. Despite these initial test results, Shell began to produce DBCP in 1956 in 
preparation for its introduction to the commercial market using the name Nemagon, 
followed by Dow in 1957 under the name Fumazone.19 
Dow and Shell continued testing DBCP on lab animals throughout the 
1950s. Further testing confirmed the initial findings, concluding, “Liver, lung and 
kidney effects might be expected…Testicular atrophy may result from prolonged 
repeated exposure.”20 However, Shell Chemical Company intentionally withheld 
some of the toxicological test results and recommended safety precautions while 
understating other potential hazards associated with the agro-chemical in its product 
data summary report that was submitted to the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
in 1961. In 1964, Nemagon and Fumazone were both approved for commercial 
sale provided the chemical packaging displayed mild warning labels such as “Do 
not breathe vapors” and “Do not contact with skin and eyes.”21 Within months, 
DBCP was being used in the United States on over 40 different agricultural crops, 
including soybeans, pineapples, nuts, and cotton.22
Standard Fruit and other banana companies began to use DBCP on a large scale 
on plantations across the globe beginning in 1969, with the first registered use in 
Nicaragua recorded on August 14, 1973.23 
Though they were not the most effective at combating nematode infestations, 
the DBCP products proved to be the most cost efficient due to their 40 to 60 
percent lower cost than the other nematicides.24 In order for the chemical to be 
effective, DBCP had to be absorbed by the soil and come into physical contact with 
nematode populations. Plantation managers eventually discovered two primary 
methods of applying the nematicides to the sprawling rows of banana plants. First, 
workers used long devices imported from Taiwan, known as “kyoritzu,” that were 
comparable to oversized syringes to inject a diluted solution of water and DBCP 
as close to the banana plant root as possible. Teams of four to six workers would 
cover approximately three hectares of plants daily using this method.25 The other 
popular application method used on plantations involved distributing the chemical 
through the irrigation system and aspersion towers. While this second method was 
more efficient than the manual injection of DBCP, it could only be used given the 
appropriate dry soil conditions, lack of wind, and stable temperature range. Under 
these conditions, DBCP was typically mixed into the irrigation system at the end of 
the working day and allowed to saturate the plants and soil overnight.26 
Both application methods resulted in excessive exposure of workers and their 
families to the nematicide. Banana workers using the direct injection method were 
frequently splattered with DBCP residue when the liquid encountered obstacles in 
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the ground like roots or rocks. Since these workers rarely wore protective clothing, 
the chemical would be absorbed through the skin, respiratory tract, and into workers’ 
clothing. Workers were also regularly splashed with the liquid chemical and exposed 
to its fumes when they were required to manually dilute the chemical throughout 
the day and pour the water-DBCP mixture into their kyoritzu. When the chemical 
was applied through the irrigation system overnight, everyone living around the 
plantation would inhale DBCP’s vapors the following morning as the sun heated 
the earth creating a layer of evaporated liquid residue trapped by the thick canopy 
of banana leaves. Former banana plantation workers tell stories of waking up to 
thick clouds of pungent fumes enveloping both the fields in which they worked and 
their homes that were situated on the periphery of the plantations.27 The irrigation 
application method also resulted in higher contamination of rivers, creeks, and 
other drinking water sources.28 Furthermore, workers and their families ingested 
chemical residues by eating food produced and/or prepared in close proximity to 
DBCP.29 
Although the workers and their families were unaware of it at the time, 
their repeated exposure to DBCP posed a serious health risk. The mild cautionary 
warnings provided on the barrels of DBCP products were of little help to the 
workers using the nematicides. Angel Espinoza, a Nicaraguan lawyer representing 
victims of DBCP exposure, explained bluntly that the warning labels “were written 
in English, and the banana workers didn’t know English, and even in English the 
labels only advised in general terms that the chemical could be dangerous.”30 Tests 
conducted on the product in the three decades since its introduction to Nicaragua 
have begun to illuminate just how dangerous the product really was. In addition 
to being categorized as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” by the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer, DBCP has been linked to kidney damage, liver 
damage, respiratory tract toxicity, testicular damage, and male infertility.31 
In response to these test results and the discovery of rampant male infertility 
in a California DBCP production plant, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) banned general use of the potent nematicide in 1979. However, transnational 
chemical corporations were permitted to continue producing and exporting DBCP 
to countries with less stringent environmental and labor regulations.32 Although 
United Fruit Company stopped use of DBCP after the EPA ban, other transnational 
fruit corporations like Standard Fruit Company continued to use the product into 
the 1980s in an effort to avoid production and profit losses.33 In Nicaragua, leftover 
stockpiles of DBCP were used on both nationalized and private banana plantations 
until 1985. The chemical was not formally prohibited until 1993.34
As a result of the prolonged use of the toxic nematicide, thousands of 
former banana plantation workers now suffer the agonizing symptoms of DBCP 
exposure. For example, Pedro Lezama, a 64-year-old former plantation worker, 
blames Nemagon for his sterility, asthma, migraines, blurred vision, and chronic 
body aches. Fifty-two-year-old Teléforo López, a former Chinandegan plantation 
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worker, suffers from over 30 cancerous tumors in his legs, abdomen, thorax, neck, 
and back. Julio César Peralta, the eight-year-old son of a plantation worker, suffers 
from physical deformities, hemorrhaging in his eyes and nose, and a variety of 
skin problems.35 Similar health problems afflict thousands of former Chinandegan 
banana plantation workers and their families who now blame DBCP for their 
ailment. According to another victim of DBCP exposure, Victorino Espinales, the 
effects of the chemical’s use in Nicaragua have been devastating. “We’ve arrived 
at the conclusion that this problem is one very similar to the bombs of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki: 25 years later we are suffering the consequences of this deadly 
product.”36 
The Fight to be Heard in Court
Twenty years after the last drops of Nemagon were injected into the soils 
of Chinandega, a controversial movement of over 20,000 former banana plantation 
workers emerged to demand indemnity from the transnational corporations 
responsible for their exposure to the “Dew of Death.”37 The source of the numerous 
health problems plaguing the former banana plantation workers was not known until 
the mid-1980s. The man largely responsible for unearthing the culprit agro-chemical 
was Victorino Espinales Reyes, an ex-Sandinista politician and charismatic leader 
of ASOTRAEXDAN (the Association of Workers and Former Workers Affected by 
the Pesticide Nemagon) founded in 2000. Espinales became active with the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) when he was only in his late teens. In 
1971, he was assigned to clandestinely organize workers on the María Elsa, Elisa 
y Alfonso Angelina banana plantations in Chinandega. In order to complete his 
obligation to the revolutionary movement, Espinales became a plantation worker 
cutting, packaging, and applying pesticides to the bananas that covered much of 
the region. After the triumph of the Sandinista revolution in July 1979, Espinales 
remained active in one of the many banana worker unions and led a commission 
that same year to understand the widespread occurrence of skin infections, vision 
problems, depression, male infertility, and other ailments within the sector.38 
However, Espinales would not discover the correlation between DBCP use and these 
various ailments until 1985. Then working as the President of the Environmental 
Commission for the National Assembly, Espinales was informed by a group of 
Costa Rican and Colombian banana worker union leaders that the nematicide that 
had been applied for years had been linked to many deaths in their countries.39 After 
the Sandinistas were voted out of office in the 1990 elections, Espinales decided to 
devote himself to organizing those affected by DBCP exposure. 
Despite its origins in the Sandinista Revolution, the Nicaraguan movement 
that developed in the 1990s was largely a response to the powerful Costa Rican 
movement that had developed in the mid-1980s. Like in Nicaragua, banana organizers 
began to notice an astonishing increase in the prevalence of certain health problems 
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in communities of former banana workers. The first cases of male infertility linked 
to DBCP exposure were discovered in Costa Rica in 1977. By 1990, some 1,500 
Costa Ricans had been diagnosed as infertile as a result of exposure to Nemagon.40 
Costa Rica’s National Insurance Institute (INS), the nationalized health insurance 
company, bore the financial costs of evaluating the workers. In addition, many of 
the infertile workers began to file for compensation from the state institute under a 
provision of the Costa Rican Labor Risk Law that provided payment to individuals 
who had lost their testicles as a result of their occupation. By 1988, about 500 
infertile banana workers had received compensation payments between U.S. $500-
$2,000 from the INS.41 
The INS compensation was unsatisfactory to some of the Costa Rican 
workers, especially after hearing that Californian workers who had received 
compensation after pressing legal charges against Dow and Shell for sterility caused 
by exposure to DBCP had been awarded up to $2.8 million each in the late 1970s.42 
Using connections within the INS, the Costa Rican victims of DBCP exposure were 
able to contact a Dallas, Texas-based law firm in 1982 to begin legal proceedings 
in the U.S. Between 1983 and 1990, approximately 400 workers filed suits against 
Dow Chemical and Shell Oil in U.S. courts.43 However, the workers were routinely 
denied access to the U.S. judicial system on the grounds of forum non conveniens, 
a legal doctrine “which allowed judges to dismiss suits by foreign plaintiffs on the 
grounds that the forum or court that the plaintiff had chosen was not convenient 
or proper because the injury or death took place elsewhere.”44 According to Erika 
Rosenthal of the Pesticide Action Network, forum non conveniens “has been used 
as a shield or a way for U.S. corporations to evade liability.”45 Finally, the Texas 
Supreme Court overturned forum non conveniens in a 5-4 ruling on March 28, 
1990. Within two years, Dow Chemical, Shell Oil, Standard Fruit, and Chiquita 
Brands had settled out of court with 800 Costa Rican workers for approximately 
$20 million, with each individual receiving between $1,500 and $15,000 after legal 
fees.46 
The case of the Costa Rican banana workers established a strong precedent 
that allowed a class action lawsuit in which some 26,000 workers from Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and five 
other African and Caribbean countries were able to settle out of court in 1997 
for $41.5 million, with each worker receiving an average of $1,500.47 The Costa 
Rican movement also acted as a catalyst for individual national movements to 
develop across the global south, including Nicaragua. After learning of the Costa 
Rican law suit at a grassroots legal service seminar held in San Jose in September 
1992, Álvaro Ramírez, the president of the Nicaraguan Association of Democratic 
Attorneys, began legal proceedings on behalf of 812 Nicaraguan workers affected by 
Nemagon.48 The case ended in 1997 when Dow Chemical agreed to pay $22 million 
to the Nicaraguans. Tragically, only a fraction of the multi-million dollar settlement 
trickled down into the pockets of the banana workers. It is estimated that the 812 
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plaintiffs collectively received only $143,000 while the U.S. law firm that filed the 
case retained an impressive $21.8 million.49 Additionally, plaintiffs were “forced 
to sign a document that exonerated the transnationals of further damages caused to 
the workers and to their children.”50 These settlements were clearly insufficient to 
compensate for the suffering of the banana plantation workers.
While these settlements were inadequate, non-U.S. workers for TNCs had at 
least successfully fought for a forum in which to seek justice against their employers. 
Other foreign workers who had suffered occupational injuries while employed by 
TNCs, especially the victims of the 1984 Union Carbide chemical plant explosion 
in Bhopal, India, were anxious to take advantage of legal opening established by the 
Costa Rican case and further their own case of corporate accountability.51 However, 
the Texas State Legislature prevented such action by reinstating the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens in 1993.52 Workers affected by exposure to Nemagon, as well 
as the Bhopal victims and others struggling against TNCs across the globe would 
have to find an alternative route to justice.
In Nicaragua, banana workers responded to the doctrine’s reinstatement by 
seeking redress in the national judicial system. In 1996, Victorino Espinales and 
other leaders began to lobby the National Assembly to pass a law to provide legal 
support in future lawsuits brought against the corporations by affected workers.53 
Nicaraguan law firms also continued collecting medical information in coordination 
with the movement leaders, such as the 1998 report that revealed that 169 of 500 
ex-banana workers surveyed suffered from different types of cancer.54 During 
this period, workers also continued to spread the word of the correlation between 
Nemagon and various illnesses and organize behind the leadership of Espinales.55 
However, the movement had little success rallying popular and governmental 
support. 
As a result, the movement that had developed under Espinales began a new 
more public phase of their struggle. The March 1999 imprisonment of Espinales for 
allegedly making death threats towards Chinandegan politicians and for threatening 
the freedom of commerce led the movement to initiate a campaign of direct action. 
The leader and many of his followers began a hunger strike to protest both Espinales’ 
imprisonment and to bring greater attention to their cause. The flurry of newspaper 
coverage that resulted from the hunger strike conveniently highlighted the start of a 
government commission centered in the city of El Viejo, Chinandega, to investigate 
the impact of Nemagon in the region.56 
The workers continued their public acts of direct action in November 1999 
by organizing what would become the first of four long marches from Chinandega 
to Managua. The 133-kilometer trek made by several hundred campesinos was 
intended to highlight the plight of the victims while articulating their demands to 
the rest of the nation. According to Espinales, the two main goals of the movement 
were to secure a fair compensation from Standard Fruit Company and Dole and to 
pressure the Nicaraguan government to establish a permanent health commission 
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in the countryside to both study the various ailments of campesinos and provide 
medical treatment.57 
After being received by Sandinista representatives of the National Assembly, 
Espinales and the other workers marched across town to the U.S. Embassy to 
continue their protest. The workers intended to deliver documents containing 
medical evidence of the correlation between Nemagon exposure and their illnesses 
along with a letter to U.S. Ambassador Oliver Garza requesting the support of the 
U.S. government in their continuing lawsuits against the TNCs.58 Though they 
were unable to meet with Garza, another embassy official met with members of the 
movement and expressed his support for the workers’ right to protest, but did not 
comment on the U.S. government’s position on their struggle.59 Though the workers 
failed to secure the support of the U.S. government during their visit to the embassy, 
they certainly “began to make themselves heard” to both the Nicaraguan and U.S. 
governments.60 Their shouts of “We Want Justice” and “No More Exploitation by the 
Transnational Standard Fruit Company” not only helped to raise the consciousness 
of the general public, but also acted to inform other former Chinandegan banana 
plantation workers suffering from similar illnesses of the probable link to the toxic 
nematicide.61
The next step in the Nemagon victims’ direct action campaign was to rally 
local support in Chinandega to place greater pressure on the government to provide 
institutional support to the movement. In the middle of July 2000, approximately 
200 former banana and sugar cane workers blocked the main highway at the entrance 
to the state capital demanding support for an “Emergency Law of Pesticides” that 
would provide legal assistance to the Nemagon victims, as well as other local issues 
such as the titling of disputed land in the region. After three days of sustaining the 
blockade, the Chinandegan police arrested Espinales and three other leaders while 
allegedly confiscating 18 machetes, various metal pipes, and 130 wooden clubs 
(which the workers argued were used for coffee grinding) from the protesters. The 
demonstration was then moved to the police headquarters, where some 100 women 
affected by Nemagon announced the beginning of a hunger strike in protest of 
Espinales’ imprisonment. Espinales and the other movement leaders were released 
later that afternoon and the police promised to respect the workers’ right to protest, 
so long as they stopped their blockade of the highway.62 Though their rights of 
assembly and expression were preserved, the workers failed to secure government 
support for their struggle.
Following their demonstration in Chinandega, Espinales and his followers 
decided to return to Managua to continue pressuring the government to provide them 
with medical attention and legal assistance in their cases against the producers and 
users of DBCP. The protesters set out on the week-long journey from Chinandega to 
Managua in late August and arrived in front of the National Assembly on September 
1, 2000, where they began to voice their demands and attract media attention. First, 
many of the protesters participated in a seven-day long hunger strike to pressure 
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legislators to help their cause. However, 16 protesters involved in the hunger 
strike were forced to abandon the demonstration and return to Chinandega after 
nearly dying as a result of the combination of their pesticide-related illnesses and 
malnutrition, while four others were hospitalized in Managua.63 
As a result of their actions, the workers drew the attention of Human Rights 
Ombudsman Benjamín Pérez, who visited the protest camp to meet with Espinales 
and other ex-banana workers. After the meeting, Pérez noted, “The real battle and 
solution to the problems that are impacting the campesinos affected by Nemagon are 
inside the National Assembly” and pledged to meet with the Assembly’s directorate 
to encourage the passage of a proposed bill that would provide legal aid to the 
workers.64 Despite the support of Pérez, the National Assembly continued to delay 
the approval of the bill, likely fearing political and economic ramifications from the 
U.S. government. 
 In response to the continued inaction, Espinales and the several hundred 
other protesters issued an ultimatum to the Nicaraguan legislators on September 
5, 2000, to pass the law that had been proposed four years earlier in the coming 
48 hours, or the workers would stage a nude march through Managua “to show 
the parliamentarians that we are better citizens than they are, and more true to our 
word.”65 More tangibly, the “march of the naked” would have forced the public to 
accept the physical fragility and weakness of the hundreds of campesinos suffering 
from cancers and skin diseases. The workers hoped their willingness to sacrifice 
humility would shame the Nicaraguan government and the TNCs, both alienated 
from mortal impacts of pesticide use, into taking action.
 Finally on November 23, 2000, the National Assembly made the historic 
decision to pass legislation to provide legal support to the former banana plantation 
workers.66 Law 364, the “Special Law for the Procedure of Law Suits Filed by 
those Affected by the Use of Pesticides Made with DBCP (Nemagon),” contained 
a number of provisions intended to circumvent the legal obstacle of forum non 
conveniens. It also established a minimum allowable settlement in order to avoid 
the outcome of the Costa Rican-led class action lawsuits of the 1990s, which 
resulted in only meager payouts for the affected workers. According to Bayardo 
Izaba, a lawyer with the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights, the law was so 
helpful because it “establishes a very rapid procedure for handling judgments that 
workers bring before the courts.”67 
Specifically, Law 364 mandates that foreign companies must provide a 
minimum payment of one hundred thousand dollars for each case brought against 
them in Nicaragua within 90 days to pay for legal expenses and to ensure that 
workers will receive compensation if the court rules against the TNC. Under the law, 
the money is returned if the foreign corporation wins the case.68 Most importantly, 
the law notes that TNCs must forfeit the right to invoke the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens if they refuse to pay the stated sum or hear a case in Nicaraguan 
courts.69 Thus, workers who are denied access to U.S. courts on the basis of forum 
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non conveniens have a chance of winning a just compensation by suing the TNCs 
in Nicaraguan courts, whereas previously TNCs could simply refuse to respect the 
jurisdiction of the Nicaraguan judicial system after being found liable for damages. 
Juan J. Dominguez, a U.S.-based lawyer representing some of the thousands of 
Nicaraguan Nemagon victims in court, noted the importance of Law 364 by stating 
“for the first time, there’s a law in the country where the tort occurred. It provides 
defendants with a forum to defend themselves. They can choose either forum and 
there are adequate laws and measure of damages.”70  
Overwhelming Obstacles on the Road to Justice
Though Espinales and the other victims of Nemagon exposure made 
great progress toward holding the TNCs accountable with the passage of Law 
364, the universal perils of corporate globalization threatened the movement’s 
legislative victory. In this era of neo-liberal fundamentalism, where international 
standardization and market supremacy have achieved status of infallibility, the 
Nicaraguan government’s decision to provide institutional support to the workers 
was considered blasphemous by globalization’s most vociferous advocates: TNCs 
and the U.S. government. Such a challenge to the disparity between the international 
rights of corporations and those of workers threatened to set a dangerous precedent 
that undermined status quo international power relations. Thus, the proponents of 
globalization attempted to exploit their position of relative privilege in the global 
political-economic arena to pressure the Nicaraguan government to reconsider the 
new law. 
After the passage of Law 364, the targeted TNCs immediately launched a 
campaign to undermine the legislation. One Dow Chemical spokesperson noted 
“Special Law 364 contains numerous provisions that simply make it impossible for 
Dow (or the other targeted companies) to receive a fair trial in Nicaraguan courts. In 
fact, Law 364 ensures the entry of judgments that are completely inconsistent with 
due process.”71 Rather than risk a guilty verdict in the Nicaraguan courts, the TNCs 
organized to pressure the Nicaraguan government to revoke Law 364. Dole, Dow, 
and Shell recruited former Clinton and Reagan administration officials to lobby 
the Bush administration to urge the Nicaraguan government to repeal the law.72 
This strategy was evidently effective, as Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly 
discussed the issue of Law 364 with Nicaragua’s Foreign Minister, Norman 
Caldera. In March 2002, U.S. officials increased their pressure on Caldera. U.S. 
Ambassador Oliver Garza presented a formal letter to Caldera on March 19 “asking 
the new government of Enrique Bolaños… to look into the constitutionality of Law 
364.”73 Caldera responded by issuing a letter to the Nicaraguan Attorney General, 
Francisco Fiallos, noting that the critiques of Law 364 emanating from the U.S. 
embassy “could be valid.”74 Finally on September 2, Fiallos issued a formal petition 
to the Supreme Court of Nicaragua asserting that the law should be “revoked and 
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declared unconstitutional.”75
 While U.S. officials were busy pressuring Nicaragua to annul the legislation, 
Law 364 came under criticism during negotiations for the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).  In a round of 2002 negotiations, Mark Smith, 
a representative of both the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in 
Latin America and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, made the argument that “the 
neutralization of Law 364 should take place before trade agreements are signed.”76 
Furthermore, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the body charged 
principally with drafting and negotiating CAFTA, described Law 364 as consisting 
of  “onerous requirements” such as “truncated judicial proceedings; imposition of 
a $100,000 non-refundable bond per defendant as a condition for firms to put up a 
defense in court; escrow requirements of approximately $21 million earmarked for 
payment of awards; irrefutable presumptions of causation; liquidated damages as 
minimum liabilities; and no stay of execution of a judgment pending appeal.”77
In reaction to this U.S. campaign, the former banana plantation workers 
resumed their direct action tactics in an attempt to ensure the preservation of Law 364. 
On October 20, Espinales’ followers rallied in Chinandega and marched through the 
provincial capital “demanding that the government respect Law 364 and that their 
solicitations for support from the government be listened to.”78  Following the local 
demonstration, some 1,200 former workers again marched the 133 kilometers from 
Chinandega to Managua with the intent of submitting a document signed by all of 
the plaintiffs in cases against the TNCs to the U.S. embassy, the president’s home, 
and finally the National Assembly where they planned to remain “the time that is 
necessary until this issue is resolved.”79  On November 20, the protesters received 
promising news from the country’s Supreme Court of Justice. After meeting with 
Espinales, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice Alba Luz Ramos and the 
other justices issued a statement announcing that “the opinion expressed by the 
Attorney General Francisco Fiallos in reference to Law 364 in no way constitutes 
the judgment of the Court.”80 Furthermore, the National Assembly agreed to call a 
special session to meet with the movement’s leaders and discuss the government’s 
position on the issue. 
The National Assembly met on November 22, 2002, and issued a resolution 
advising the Attorney General and other government offices on the Nemagon issue. 
It instructed both the Human Rights Commission and Labor Issues Commission 
to assist the workers obtain responses to their “just demands” and recommended 
further studies to “evaluate the situation of those affected and their families.” After 
the session, the President of the National Assembly commented that “the doors 
of the National Assembly are open not only to listen to the people affected by 
Nemagon, but also to tell them [the victims] that we share and are in solidarity 
with the pain and suffering of their families and we trust that the damages caused 
by the use of those chemicals will be repaid in a just manner.”81 Having received 
the reaffirmation of the constitutionality of Law 364 from the Supreme Court and 
109Iowa Historical Review
Confronting the Perils of Globalization
support from the National Assembly, the protesters returned to Chinandega to 
continue focusing on the legal proceedings of their law suits against the TNCs.
The victims of DBCP exposure began flooding the Nicaraguan courts 
with lawsuits brought against Dow, Shell, and Dole after the passage of Law 364 
in early 2001. By March 24, 2001, over 400 workers had filed suit demanding a 
cumulative compensation of more than $400 million from the fruit and chemical 
companies since the first suit was filed on February 28. Rather than filing a single 
class-action lawsuit, the workers and their lawyers decided to file multiple suits in 
groups of approximately 100 workers each because the Nicaraguan courts “would 
not have the ability to hear it [a class action suit]” as a result of their “limited 
resources,” according to one of the workers’ lawyers Boanerges Ojeda.82 By the 
end of August, 26 separate suits had been filed on behalf of over 3,600 victims of 
Nemagon exposure to demand a total compensation of more than $3.8 billion. In 
response, the targeted TNCs had only submitted a letter denying all culpability 
to the workers’ lawyers.83 As publicity of the lawsuits saturated Nicaragua, more 
former banana plantation workers organized to demand compensation from the 
chemical and fruit companies. In late October 2001, the Nicaraguan judicial system 
had received 32 separate suits for a total compensation of almost $4.5 billion, and 
that number continued to grow.84 Though the workers still had not received a ruling 
from the Nicaraguan courts during their November 2002 demonstrations, one of 
their lawyers Walter Gutiérrez took the media opportunity to discuss the importance 
of the lawsuits. Gutiérrez noted that the suits had the potential to set an international 
precedent that could be used by global victims of Nemagon and other products 
that “have caused equal or worse disasters to the humanity of the people in poorer 
countries.”85 
The first set of rulings on the Nemagon cases was issued on December 
11, 2002, by the Third District Civil Court just weeks after the former banana 
plantation workers had left their protest camp in Managua with support promised 
by the National Assembly. The victims enjoyed another pivotal victory when the 
Nicaraguan court ruled in favor of 583 plaintiffs and ordered Dow, Shell, and Dole to 
pay a sum of $490 million for damages caused by DBCP exposure.86 The ruling was 
significant for a number of reasons. First, it provided still greater media coverage 
of the issue, thereby acting as a recruiting agent and stimulus for greater public and 
governmental support. Many protesters currently demanding indemnity from the 
TNCs cite the ruling as their motivation for joining the movement.87 Furthermore, 
the ruling provided a much needed source of hope and inspiration for the thousands 
of workers who had been suffering from fatal illnesses and struggling for a just 
compensation with little success for years. One of the lawyers representing the 
workers commented “with this sentence we see a light in the tunnel for them.”88 
More concretely, the ruling meant that the case would finally be heard in U.S. 
courts under the stipulations of Law 364 and with the support of the Nicaraguan 
government where the TNCs could no longer elude responsibility if found guilty. 
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Once heard, the case would represent the first of its kind as a toxic damages suit 
filed by foreign workers against U.S.-based corporations.89
 While the ruling was a huge success for the workers’ movement and inspired 
one of the group’s lawyers to proclaim “we will go to the United States to pound 
on the doors of the transnationals,” many obstacles remained between the victims 
and a just compensation.90 First, the ruling only represented a decision for nine 
cumulative cases. By mid-December 2002, 74 more cases awaited rulings from 
the Third District Civil Court Judge Vida Benavente.91 Secondly, the TNCs were 
spurred by the verdict to revive their assault against the constitutionality of Law 
364. Michael Carter, a representative of Dole Food Company, traveled to Nicaragua 
shortly after the ruling and told local newspapers with great confidence that the only 
way to resolve the issue would be an out of court settlement, since U.S. courts would 
not accept the cases as dictated by an unconstitutional law.92 Also, the TNCs affected 
by Judge Benavente’s ruling almost immediately communicated their refusal to pay 
such a large sum to workers in the global South. After citing the fact that Hawaiian 
pineapple farm workers who suffered from DBCP exposure had received more than 
$1 million per person, lawyer Ángel Espinoza informed the press “they [the TNCs] 
say that it isn’t the same to pay a North American as it is to pay a Nicaraguan… 
They say that they will pay what is just, but they believe that what is just is $6,000 
maximum… They say that what we are asking is irrational.”93 
 The former banana plantation workers and their lawyers could do little to 
respond to the criticism, and instead focused on attempting to maintain a cohesive 
and unified movement in the face of growing fractionalization. Of particular concern 
was a general assembly of Nemagon victims called by the Nicaraguan law firm 
Provost and Umphrey on February 9, 2003. Though it legitimately represented some 
former workers in cases filed against 10 different fruit and chemical corporations, 
the firm attempted to capitalize on the success of the main law firm representing the 
movement, Ojeda, Gutiérrez, Espinoza, and Associates, to attract more potential 
clients. Provost and Umphrey invited two U.S.-based lawyers to attend the general 
assembly and speak about the legal details of the case and the possibility of an 
out of court settlement, even though the firm had not yet received a ruling on any 
of the cases that they had filed. In an attempt to further associate the firm with 
the mutual success of Victorino Espinales’ direct action tactics and the Ojeda law 
firm, the U.S. lawyers discussed the importance of the “marches, protests, and 
public demonstrations” carried out by the workers that had created a “favorable 
environment in the United States.”94 Lawyer Ángel Espinoza of the Ojeda firm 
responded to the general assembly called by the Provost and Umphrey firm by 
stating, “[L]acking any sense of ethics, they [Provost and Umphrey] have tried to 
make the people and their clients think that the ruling [of December 11] was won by 
them when that is not true, and in doing so have wanted to give themselves credit 
that isn’t theirs.”95 Though the movement had never been completely unified under 
a single organization and several law firms represented smaller groups of victims 
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of DBCP exposure, the different factions had cooperated and co-existed mostly 
harmoniously until late 2002.
  After months of eagerly awaiting further rulings from the Third District 
Civil Court on the other Nemagon cases and hoping for progress in the efforts to 
move the case ruled upon on December 11 to the United States, Espinales and his 
followers began to lose patience and issued demands for the Nicaraguan judicial 
system to expedite the workers’ cases. According to Espinales, it was imperative to 
quicken the legal process because “in many of the plaintiffs’ cases… delay could 
mean death.” Espinales hoped that a public demonstration on May 17, 2003, with 
the participation of the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights, lawyers representing 
the workers, various human rights and environmental NGOs, and delegations of 
former banana plantation workers from Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama who 
were also victims of DBCP exposure would spur the Nicaraguan courts to expedite 
the cases. The workers did not receive a response from the Nicaraguan judicial 
system despite the show of international and cross-sector solidarity.
 Moreover, the illusion of unity presented in the May 2003 rally was quickly 
supplanted by reports of growing divisions within the movement. Seemingly due 
to the active campaign by the law firm Provost and Umphrey, many former banana 
plantation workers began to defect from the Ojeda, Gutiérrez, and Espinoza firm 
that had won the December 11 ruling after complaining of exorbitant monthly 
fees. According to thousands of protesters who gathered in Chinandega’s National 
Stadium on August 27, 2003, to demand the payment of an indemnity from the 
TNCs and voice other complaints, the Ojeda firm had been charging the former 
banana plantation workers 67 million cordobas per month (roughly $4 million USD) 
for representing the movement in court. Such fees had a devastating impact on the 
individual level. In the case of one campesina involved in the suit, Segunda Gómez 
Gutiérrez had to pay a 362,000 cordoba fee (about U.S. $22,000) to the Ojeda law 
firm although she hadn’t received a cent in compensation from the TNCs. 96Among 
the other criticisms voiced at the protest was a denouncement of the movement’s 
charismatic leader Victorino Espinales. Some 500 workers alleged that Espinales 
had falsified documents and forged their signatures in order to maintain their names 
on the list of plaintiffs represented by the Ojeda law firm.97 The accusation resulted 
in a government investigation. Although the investigation produced no evidence 
of such manipulation, the disparagement of Espinales reflected the growing 
disagreement within the movement over tactics and leaders.
 The movement’s divisions were compounded by an announcement from 
Dole Fruit Company in early September that the corporation refused to recognize 
the jurisdiction of the Nicaraguan courts. Representatives of the fruit company 
argued that the Nicaraguan court had failed to make a neutral ruling on the case, 
which jeopardized the judicial system’s competency. As a result, Dole requested 
that the case be transferred to the United States to be heard by a neutral judge.98 
Though the critique of the Nicaraguan legal system was insulting to the lawyers 
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involved in the case, the former banana workers would finally have the opportunity 
to present their case in a forum from which the TNCs could not escape if found 
guilty.
  Many of the plaintiffs involved in the suit were hopeful that a just 
compensation was just within reach now that the case was being transferred to the 
United States. However, their hopes were soon dashed by crucial translation errors 
that threatened to invalidate the entire case. The first error discovered by the U.S. 
court in the translated suit was that the defendant Dole Food Company had been 
misrepresented as “Dole Food Corporation.”99 Other errors were later detected in 
the suit, such as the inclusion of Standard Fruit and Vegetables as a defendant, 
a subsidiary of Standard Fruit Company that was not founded until 1998, long 
after the workers’ exposure to DBCP.100 Days later, Judge Nora M. Manella of the 
Central District Court of California based in Los Angeles ruled that Dole would be 
dropped from the suit because of the translation error, and that a decision would be 
made by November 3, 2003, as to whether the case would continue or be closed. 
Despite the growing possibility of leaving the U.S. courts without even presenting 
his case, lawyer Walter Gutiérrez noted that the exclusion of Dole from the suit 
was of little importance. “Each one of them [the TNCs] is responsible for the total 
amount. In other words, one can pay the $498 million or they can divide it between 
two, or divide it among three. That is their problem! But yes, they are going to have 
to pay.”101
 Gutiérrez’s remarks proved to be premature. After discovering more 
translation errors and “legal irregularities,” in the December 11 ruling, Judge 
Manella closed the workers’ case. In response, the law firm Ojeda, Gutiérrez, and 
Espinoza, which was responsible for the case filed with errors, blamed the failure 
on Victorino Espinales and other law firms, accusing both of being affiliated with 
Dole. The firm also accused Judge Manella of closing the case for political reasons, 
citing “a relationship between the judge, her father, and the government of President 
George Bush.”102 Espinales responded in typical fashion by threatening protests 
and direct action against the law firm in the days following the announcement and 
lamented that the closure of the case was “a death sentence” for the victims awaiting 
compensation.103  
With the plaintiffs’ hopes dashed and their internal conflicts becoming more 
pronounced, the TNCs attempted to put a final end to the workers’ movement by 
filing a countersuit against the law firm and plaintiffs involved in the error-ridden 
case. Dole submitted a countersuit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) law on December 23, 2003, against the State of Nicaragua, 
the workers, and the law firm representing the movement in court. The U.S. federal 
law, which was created in 1970 to prosecute organized crime rings, was now being 
used by the TNCs to demand repayment for the slander suffered by the corporations 
involved in a fraudulent suit founded on fabricated medical evidence. The suit also 
alleged that in addition to not actually suffering from exposure to DBCP, many 
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of the victims had never worked on the banana plantations in question.104 Shell 
and Dow Chemical Company followed Dole’s lead and submitted similar suits on 
January 21, 2004, but initiated the process in civil court instead of attempting to 
invoke the RICO law in their case.105 
To the Streets Again
As the TNCs and the U.S. government sought to disempower the Nemagon 
workers’ movement, Espinales and ASOTRAEXDAN responded by reaffirming 
the persistent power of the Nicaraguan nation-state and by harnessing nationalist 
opposition against foreign intervention to their struggle. Yet ASOTRAEXDAN’s 
attempt to represent itself as an icon of Nicaraguan nationalism had great potential 
not only for unity but also for conflict as the movement’s breed of nationalism 
was heavily associated with the country’s most powerful anti-imperialist ideology: 
Sandinismo. Though the various factions of Nemagon workers in Nicaragua 
apparently agreed with Espinales’ declaration that “Sandinismo is not just Daniel 
Ortega [the leader of the FLSN],”106 they deeply disagreed about what precisely 
defined Sandinismo—a conflict that became especially intense after the FSLN 
leadership struck an infamous pact with their main rival, the ruling PLC, in August 
1999.107 Nemagon victims already opposed to Espinales’ leadership thus turned 
even more against ASOTRAEXDAN, as its charismatic leader sought not only to 
represent the entire Nemagon workers’ movement but also to embody a new form 
of Sandinismo.
Espinales’ turn toward a greater embrace of nationalism first became 
visible when he and other members of ASOTRAEXDAN planned another 12-
day march from Chinandega to Managua. The organizers of the march had 
ambitious expectations for their third trek to the capitol, estimating that at least 
2,500 participants would leave from Chinandega, and at least 3,500 more would 
join en route as the protesters passed through Chichigalpa, León, and Managua, 
where 6,000 would weave through the streets.108 According to Espinales, the 6,000 
participants intended to “protest in front of the National Assembly, Presidential 
House, and Supreme Court to demand that these state institutions assume a legal 
position in support of the ex-workers… and condemn what the gringo companies 
did to us.”109 The workers also hoped to force the government of President Enrique 
Bolaños to publicly oppose the RICO suit filed by Dole, which “branded them [the 
workers] as international gangsters.”110 
The march left Chinandega on the morning of January 31 with Victorino 
Espinales leading the group and waving a full-sized Nicaraguan flag in an appeal to 
nationalist sentiment to rally popular support behind the former banana plantation 
workers against the foreign corporations. Espinales’ tactics worked well. In a poll 
conducted by the conservative paper La Prensa several days after the beginning of 
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the march, all five Managuans interviewed expressed deep support for the protesters. 
All five also emphasized the just nature of their struggle, including bus driver Efraín 
Centeno who simply argued, “We should support them because they are fighting 
for a just cause.”111 The marchers also won the support of key government officials, 
especially Sandinista politicians on the Labor and Human Rights Commissions.112 
However, this support was achieved at a high cost. Three protesters died during 
the march and more than 600 were forced to abandon the protest and return to 
Chinandega due to deteriorating health.113 Still, more than 5,000 workers made it 
to Managua by February 11 resolved to stay as long as necessary to achieve their 
goals in the protest. The former banana plantation workers were no longer willing 
to be ignored by the Nicaraguan government. In this regard, the march represented 
the forced recognition of the fatal externalities of the global banana trade that had 
remained hidden from global consumers for decades. As Espinales noted, he wanted 
Bolaños to be forced to see his body and “realize that the suit that they have filed 
against the North American transnationals is just.”114
Once they had established themselves in the desolate field across from the 
National Assembly, the former banana plantation workers began to threaten more 
drastic measures to achieve their goals in the protest. By February 14, the workers 
were demanding that the government provide the victims of DBCP exposure 
a permanent personal pension to cover their basic subsistence costs, as well as 
guaranteed medical attention from the Health Ministry.115 After several days passed 
without a response from President Bolaños, the workers threatened more hunger 
strikes, crucifixions, and naked marches. Espinales expressed his desire for “the 
people to see that we are willing to die of hunger in front of all of the people” 
as a means of shaming the government to take action to avoid culpability in the 
starvation of the innocent workers.116 Thus, 130 men and women who had made the 
march to Managua initiated an indefinite hunger strike on February 17 to demand a 
meeting with President Bolaños.117 Espinales recognized President Bolaños previous 
disregard for agreements signed with the workers, but explained his fixation upon 
meeting with the President by questioning the competence of other governmental 
bodies. “We don’t want anything to do with bureaucratic commissions that don’t 
resolve anything. It has been one year since we signed an accord in which the same 
President Bolaños and the Attorney General of the Republic agreed to support us, 
but they have lied to us and they haven’t complied with anything.”118
  Despite their public pressure, the workers’ hunger strike failed to force 
the government to negotiate. The strike was ended after three days when doctors 
advised the workers that they would need medication and food if they wanted to 
continue struggling for their compensations.119 Rather than accept defeat, the workers 
modified their tactics in hope of forcing a meeting with the President. Following 
a march and protest in front of the U.S. Embassy in late February, the workers 
rallied in front of the Presidential House on March 5 carrying large crucifixes and 
repeating the threat that “we are ready to die here until we have obtained justice.”120 
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The government still refused to respond.
At the same time, a long-time division in the workers’ movement culminated 
in a massive public dispute in the capital city. Benjamín Chavez, a former journalist 
for the Nicaraguan newspaper El Nuevo Diario, had become the spokesperson for 
a group of approximately 2,000 Chinandegans led by the agricultural labor union 
leader Francisco Ruiz calling themselves the “legitimate victims of Nemagon.” This 
faction of former banana plantation workers was one of several labor organization 
and law firms representing Nemagon victims that disapproved of Espinales’ 
confrontational tactics and instead channeled their energy into the legal process of 
suing the TNCs.121 On February 24, some 500 workers in the Chávez/Ruiz camp 
arrived by bus in Managua to denounce Espinales and the other “imposters” camped 
out in front of the National Assembly.122 In addition to seeking government support, 
the “legitimate victims of Nemagon” seized the opportunity to further denigrate 
Espinales. Benjamín Chávez voiced his opinion that,  “Victorino Espinales is 
distorting the true struggle of the banana workers, he knows that the majority of 
those who are there with him, in that protest, haven’t even peeled a banana, but 
he places them there in order to take a part of the indemnity in case they win 
against the transnationals.” The Ojeda, Gutiérrez, and Espinoza law firm also took 
advantage of the opportunity to criticize Espinales, adding, “The whole world says 
that he [Espinales] receives money from the transnationals to ruin the lawsuit.”123 In 
an attempt to resolve the conflict, the Office of the Ombudsman of Human Rights 
announced that it would provide medical examinations to both groups of workers to 
determine who were the real victims of agro-chemical exposure. Though the Chávez/
Ruiz group agreed to the proposal, Espinales and the members of ASOTRAEXDAN 
refused, noting, “the Ombudsman is not competent to determine who is ill… that is 
the exclusive responsibility of the courts.”124 
 In response to growing internal divisions in the workers’ movement, 
the Espinales group received an upsurge of support from local individuals and 
organizations. Students and artists performed concerts for those camped in front 
of the National Assembly. Human rights and church organizations donated food, 
medicine, and building materials, and the renowned Mejía Godoy brothers, popular 
revolutionary musicians now critical of the FSLN, offered solidarity and support. 
Michelle Najlis, a theologian and poet who visited the protesters, later reflected 
that the workers “have mobilized our consciences. They figured out how to earn 
the respect of Nicaraguan society, not only because of the legitimacy of their 
demands, but also because of their exemplary attitudes and strategies.  They have 
helped awaken civil society.  Their actions should be the first steps on a new road in 
Nicaraguan society.”125 Espinales lamented, “It is a shame that the same sensitivity 
doesn’t exist in the government.”126 However, more government officials had begun 
to pay attention to the former banana plantation workers. In response to the arrival 
and criticisms of the Chávez/Ruiz group, the Secretary General of the FSLN Daniel 
Ortega urged the workers to “unite and struggle” together against the TNCs.127
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 The protesters received more good news on March 2, 2004, when the 
Nicaraguan Judge Vida Benavente issued another ruling in favor of 81 female 
workers for a sum of $82.9 million.128 According to the judge, the women suffered 
from uterine cancer caused by DBCP exposure while working on the plantations, as 
well as exposure through contaminated drinking water sources.129 The ruling was of 
particular significance given the traditional exclusion of women from consideration 
in labor struggles and the predominant machista culture that exists in Nicaragua. The 
March 2 ruling certainly gave hope to other female victims of Nemagon exposure 
who continue to face discrimination within the movement for compensation today. 
Indeed, many movement members consider the women’s demands illegitimate, 
some even arguing that the women joined the struggle for lack of anything better 
to do.130 In response to this marginalization, a group of 50 women have organized 
to denounce the lawyers and movement leaders representing the victims of 
Nemagon exposure for refusing to represent women despite manipulating them 
into participating in public protests.131
 As the protest outside the National Assembly continued into mid-March, 
more government officials voiced their support for the workers’ movement. On 
March 16, 2004, the Ombudsman of Human Rights Benjamín Pérez requested that 
U.S. authorities use the same diligence to force the manufacturers and users of 
Nemagon to respect the human rights of those affected by the chemical that the 
government uses to force nation-states to respect citizens’ human rights.132 The same 
day, the popular Sandinista mayor of Managua Herty Lewites visited the protest 
camp and promised to pressure President Bolaños to take action on the issue. The 
mayor added that in addition to support from the municipal government, “I believe 
that it is also the responsibility of the national government to see this problem.”133
 Finally after 40 days camped in front of the National Assembly and after 
repeated threats of starvation, live burials, naked marches, and crucifixion, President 
Bolaños conceded to increasing pressure and met with the protesters. After a day 
of negotiation, Bolaños, Espinales, Benjamín Chávez, as well as other government 
officials and movement leaders signed the El Raizón Accords on March 20, 2004.134 
The agreement consisted of five points that established an outline for action by 
both the government and the workers’ movement. The first point mandated that 
the divided movement must unite their efforts and create a single petition of 
demands for the government’s own use and to present to the TNCs. Secondly, 
the government agreed to provide legal assistance to the victims and provide the 
movement with lawyers based in Washington to assist in their U.S. law suits. Third, 
Bolaños agreed to send the Ombudsman of Human Rights Benjamín Pérez to the 
U.N. International Human Rights Convention in Geneva, Switzerland with two 
movement representatives to present their case. Fourth, the government agreed 
to protect Law 364 from revision.135 Finally, the protesters agreed to end their 
protest in front of the National Assembly in exchange for government-provided 
transportation back to Chinandega and promises of medical attention. Espinales 
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expressed cautious optimism after the accords were signed, stating “[F]or now, 
we will leave satisfied, but we will continue in the struggle.”136 As the thousands 
of former banana plantation workers boarded buses to return home, one protester 
observed, “I only hope that I don’t have to come back to Managua to protest, it is 
hard for an old woman to sleep on the ground.”137
 Just days after the agreement had been signed and the protesters had returned 
to Chinandega, the El Raizón Accords came under criticism from human rights 
organizations and began to crumble. On March 26, Benjamín Pérez announced that 
he would not comply with Bolaños’ request to attend the UN meeting in Geneva 
to present the Nemagon issue. The Ombudsman defended his decision by noting 
the short notice provided by Bolaños and adding, “I can’t travel in an improvised 
manner to an event of such magnitude.”138 In light of this failure to abide by the 
El Raizón Accords, the legal advisor for the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights 
Bayardo Izabá argued, “We think that the president lied to those affected by 
Nemagon exposure. He is a liar or an irresponsible person,” in addition to asserting 
that Bolaños had hastily signed the agreement to rid Managua of the protesters in 
preparation for an upcoming governmental summit.139
 Despite the initial failures of the El Raizón Accords, the workers’ hopes 
for a just compensation from the TNCs were rekindled when another suit was filed 
in the Los Angeles courts in mid-April. Juan José Dominguez, a personal injury 
attorney based in Los Angeles, filed the suit against the TNCs alleging that the 
corporations produced and used toxic substances while intentionally withholding 
information about their risks from the workers. The suit was filed on behalf of 25 
individual plaintiffs, though the lawyer represented more than 10,000 victims of 
Nemagon exposure at the time. With the support provided by Law 364, Dominguez 
confidently stated, “Now there is no escape for the multinationals. The defendants 
will have to choose the country that pleases them to fight this case.” Dominguez 
continued, “We invite them [the TNCs] to fight in Los Angeles if they think that the 
system here in Nicaragua is corrupt.”140 The Los Angeles courts formally accepted 
the case on April 20, 2004, re-opening not only the possibility for compensation 
of the Nicaraguan workers, but a new era of international corporate accountability. 
Dominguez noted, “This case can set a legal precedent and be an example for all 
nations, that the multinational corporations can be held responsible for illicit actions 
that result in injuries, damages, or exploitation of citizens.”141
 The former banana plantation workers continued their attempts to recruit 
more victims of DBCP exposure into their movement as they pursued legal action in 
the United States. Branching out beyond the banana plantations of Chinandega, the 
movement expanded into tobacco and sugar cane growing regions of the northern 
state of Estelí. Although the sugar and tobacco plantations were either state-owned 
or domestically managed, workers in the regions assert that the plantations had 
used pesticides derived from DBCP, produced by the TNCs Shell and Dow, and that 
they now suffer the negative health effects of exposure.142 In addition to exposure 
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on the tobacco and sugar cane plantations, many workers in Estelí migrated west to 
Chinandega after the annual coffee harvest to seek seasonal employment on banana 
plantations. Thus, the National Association of People Affected by Poison officially 
opened an office in Estelí in early July 2004, representing an estimated 700 victims 
of DBCP exposure.143 
The March of No Return
 While the government had provided some institutional support for their 
movement, the workers understood that they would have to continue to pressure 
the National Assembly and President to comply with their promises. However, they 
were unable to use traditional sources of influence and power to interact with the 
state. Instead, Espinales and the other members of ASOTRAEXDAN repeatedly 
used the threat of creating a public spectacle at the expense of their own bodies 
to simultaneously shame the government, create public outrage and support, and 
reaffirm their status as victims of violence entitled to justice. This tactic follows 
an emerging trend of historically marginalized communities in Latin America 
using public performance as “a form of political action based on visual display, 
undertaken by specifically positioned social groups and actors attempting to stamp 
society with their own agenda.”144
 Much of the workers’ ire resulted from the Nicaraguan government’s refusal 
to implement an effective medical assistance program for those affected by DBCP 
exposure. By September 2004, the workers were running out of patience and began 
to seek the assistance of the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) 
to pressure the government to comply with the El Raizón Accords. In response, 
CENIDH made several phone calls to officials in the Ministry of Health, and 
considered rallying international solidarity if no changes were made. CENIDH’s 
legal advisor Bayardo Izabá threatened, “If a positive response does not exist, 
CENIDH will see it necessary to begin an international petition to denounce the 
attitude of the government, that it has put the health and lives of millions of people 
affected by the pesticide in danger.”145 
Despite these threats, the promised governmental medical attention never 
came to fruition. The Ministry of Health explained that the failure to attend to the 
needs of the Nemagon victims was a result of a chronic lack of resources. “The 
doctors declare themselves bankrupt because of the lack of materials.”146 The workers 
were reluctant to accept the excuse of the practical impossibility of establishing 
an effective health care program and redirected their dissatisfaction again at the 
National Assembly in hopes of increasing funding for the Ministry. “The members 
of parliament told us that they would support our demand, we hope they will now 
support us because the lack of medicine has killed many of us campesinos,” noted 
Espinales.147 The workers added further pressure on the government by threatening 
to return to Managua in January if their demand to increase allocated funds for the 
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Ministry of Health by 100 million cordobas (approximately $6.2 million USD) in 
the 2005 operating budget.148 
After another month of governmental inaction, Espinales and the members 
of ASOTRAEXDAN decided that they had no other option but to return to 
Managua to protest in front of the National Assembly for the fourth time since 
1999. In explaining the decision, Espinales ranted, “They [the government] have 
promised us everything, they have signed agreements upon agreements with us, 
they have told us that they are going to help us, they have formed commissions upon 
commissions, but later no one complies, they run from us to their offices, they don’t 
meet with us and only when we protest do they return our calls… now we want 
real justice.”149 While Espinales’ sentiments were widely shared among the former 
banana plantation workers, the 4,200 members of the Chávez/Ruiz faction refused 
to participate in the planned march. Chávez explained the decision by arguing that 
he and the law firm representing his faction (Ojeda, Gutiérrez, and Espinoza) had 
good relations with the Ministry of Health and suggested that it would be inhumane 
to force the ill to walk 133 kilometers to Managua. Nonetheless, Espinales 
continued planning the march and sought solidarity from other sectors, such as the 
newly mobilized sugar cane workers in Estelí, landless campesinos movements, 
and other human rights activists.150 Espinales estimated that 8-10,000 people would 
leave Chinandega on the morning of February 20, 2005, in a massive display of 
discontent with the government’s handling of the Nemagon issue. The protesters, 
who would walk 12 kilometers per day to reach Managua in early March, expressed 
three principal demands before their departure. First, they reiterated their demand 
for a 100 million cordoba allocation for medical attention in the 2005 government 
operating budget. Second, they demanded the provision of an economic pension 
to the former workers to cover basic living expenses. Finally, they insisted upon a 
revision of the February 2004 El Raizón Accords, which had been largely ignored 
by the government.151
 Approximately 3,000 protesters left as planned on the morning of February 
20 with Espinales again leading the march carrying the Nicaraguan flag on his 
shoulder. After the march had begun, Espinales announced the workers’ intentions 
to remain in Managua until a new agreement was not just signed, but fulfilled by 
the government. “This is a march of no return, because we are going to demand not 
just the signing of agreements like we did in El Raizón in 2004, but also compliance 
with those agreements.”152 
 The first to respond to the massive protest was not the Nicaraguan government, 
but rather the TNCs targeted by the movement. Just days after the protesters settled 
in front of the National Assembly in Managua, Dole Food Company spokesperson 
Humberto Hurtado began issuing statements criticizing Law 364 and discrediting 
the movement. Hurtado asserted, “There is nothing to discuss, unless they [the 
workers] withdraw their lawsuits and abandon Law 364.”153 The next day, Hurtado 
dismissed the claims that DBCP exposure was responsible for the array of illnesses 
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the former banana plantation workers suffer. “According to trustworthy scientific 
evidence, DBCP, known as Nemagon, only produced a decrease in sperm in the men 
who worked in the factories that produced the chemical.”154 He continued, “There 
is no reliable scientific evidence that links Nemagon with all of the other illnesses 
in the people who applied this product.”155 Dole’s arguments did not convince the 
more than 12,000 workers involved in lawsuits against the TNCs, and only elicited 
more fiery words from movement leader Victorino Espinales, who called them 
“idiotic and ridiculous.”156
 The first signs of a governmental response to the new protest came from 
political parties rather than the government. On March 5, the leftist Sandinista 
Party (FSLN) passed a party resolution in favor of supporting the protesters and 
attempting to obtain government support for their demands. Various members of 
the center-right Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) also expressed formal support 
for the workers and pledged to fight for government action. However, the workers 
were distrustful of the promised support after years of experiencing institutional 
deceit. “We do not want to be the political flag of anyone, of any party,” stated 
Espinales. He continued, “Until now we have navigated with the blue and white of 
the country, and as an organization…we are apolitical, and as a result we distrust 
the burst of politicians beginning to offer help who never give it concretely.”157 This 
contempt for the PLC and the FSLN echoed popular disillusionment with national 
politics in the country in post-Pacto Nicaragua. 
 However, the Bolaños government still refused to react to the Nemagon 
protest. As a result, both the workers and other organizations began to increase 
pressure on the president to resolve the conflict. In mid-March, the new Human 
Rights Ombudsman Omar Cabezas, a popular former revolutionary leader, 
denounced the Nicaraguan state and the targeted TNCs in front of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, an institution of the Organization of American 
States based in Costa Rica, for violating the human rights of those affected by DBCP 
exposure.158 In addition to Cabezas’ official denouncement, the workers issued a 
threat for violent action after the government announced that it was not planning 
to address the Nemagon issue before leaving for a weeklong vacation during Holy 
Week. Espinales announced the formation of what he called the “sacrifice brigade” 
on March 8. “There will be 90 men. 30 will bury themselves alive, 30 will crucify 
themselves, and another 30 will begin a hunger strike. If they [the government] 
remember us some day, they will find a cemetery here.”159 Moreover, the workers 
threatened self-immolation if the government refused to provide the money for 
medical attention promised in the El Raizón Accords. Sixty-five-year-old Ramón 
Catalino Suazo Molina, one of the protesters, explained the seemingly extreme 
tactics by observing, “Desperation can make you obligated to do anything.”160 
 As Holy Week approached, the government had still refused to meet 
with representatives from the movement or take action on the issue. In response, 
Espinales and ASOTRAEXDAN issued a new set of demands and threatened self-
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immolation if the government refused to discuss the list in the next 24 hours. First, 
the workers demanded the immediate ban of a group of 12 agro-chemicals still 
used in Nicaragua known as the “dirty dozen,” such as Aldicarb and other highly 
toxic chemicals that have been linked to negative health effects. Second, housing 
and land for more than 3,000 Chinandegans were requested from the government. 
Finally, the workers reiterated their demand for a government-sponsored pension 
to cover the cost of living.161 After releasing the demands, Espinales warned, “if 
they [the members of parliament] leave for vacation today, we are going to begin to 
execute our plans.”162
Though Espinales was the target of harsh criticism from CENIDH, lawyer 
Walter Gutiérrez, and Benjamín Chávez for “forcing them [the workers] to make 
risky decisions, like the sham of crucifixion, burials, and immolations,” the 
pressure was effective.163 The workers were able to pressure the government to 
agree to implement the El Raizón Accords and begin a census of those affected 
by Nemagon. Bolaños also agreed to obtain 80 visas for workers and movement 
leaders to travel to the U.S. to provide legal testimonies and continue the judicial 
process.164 Unlike previous agreements that pacified the protesters but were never 
implemented, the workers immediately began to enjoy the benefits of the new 
agreement signed on March 18. Within days, the Ministry of Health had devoted 
75 employees to opening five health centers in Managua exclusively for treating 
and testing the victims of DBCP exposure.165 Though children of the former banana 
plantation workers were not granted access to the centers despite allegations that 
they suffered genetic illnesses related to the agro-chemical, the Ministry of Health’s 
actions represented a huge victory for the protesters.166
The workers had little time to celebrate their achievement before receiving 
surprising news of secret negotiations between Dole Food Company and the 
Nicaraguan government to resolve the Nemagon issue out of court without consulting 
the victims. In late March, the BBC published a report in which Dole’s Executive 
Vice President Michael Carter confessed to having negotiated with the Nicaraguan 
Attorney General Alberto Novoa to arrange a settlement. Dole proposed that the 
Nicaraguan government permit the fruit corporation to return to Nicaragua, increase 
direct foreign investment, and create thousands of jobs in the impoverished country. 
In exchange, the Nicaraguan government would abolish Law 364, eliminating the 
legislative support that had allowed the workers to circumvent forum non conveniens 
and file suit in the United States.167 Such action would almost certainly ensure the 
failure of the thousands of lawsuits against the TNCs representing a sum of almost 
$17 billion. Though the government denied negotiating with Dole, the allegations 
infuriated the workers’ movement. Espinales responded to the news by exclaiming, 
“We do not accept that while the government publicly promises to help us, they are 
talking under the table with the transnationals to throw out our lawsuits. That would 
be treason…”168 The government has steadfastly denied the charges.
Already enraged by the allegations of secret negotiations between Dole and 
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the government, the workers sought to force Human Rights Ombudsman Omar 
Cabezas to fulfill his promise to represent the protesters’ interests in the government. 
On the afternoon of April 7, a large group of workers marched to the office of 
Cabezas to demand an immediate meeting with him. Although Cabezas agreed to 
meet with Espinales and other representatives, the accompanying workers occupied 
the building to further pressure Cabezas to comply with their demands. After three 
hours of negotiations, the workers left peacefully having reached an agreement 
with Cabezas that included continuing to hold the government accountable for the 
March 18 agreement and presenting the Nemagon issue to the 61st Session of the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission on April 11, 2005, in Geneva.169
 The following week, the protesters initiated another direct action campaign 
targeting the members of the National Assembly for refusing to meet with the workers. 
On April 14, a group of 30 began an indefinite hunger strike. Espinales communicated 
the group’s intentions of blocking the streets, expanding the hunger strike, and 
beginning self-immolations if the police intervened and members of parliament 
continued to refuse to meet with them.170 These more conventional movement 
tactics were augmented by attempts to secure greater local and international support 
to pressure the government to reach an agreement with the protesters. Local human 
rights groups and religious organizations began to provide the protest camp with 
food donations and even agreed to establish a solidarity camp beginning May 1. 
Deborah García, a representative of one of the religious organizations involved in 
the solidarity camp, explained their actions by arguing, “Because of the suffering of 
all of them, we are trying to make them [the government] listen and not forget these 
companions.”171 Movement leaders even tried to contact the leftist documentary 
filmmaker Michael Moore to raise international consciousness of their struggle.172 
 In the face of mounting pressure, the Nicaraguan government finally 
reached a comprehensive agreement with the protesters on May 13. The 19-
point agreement was signed both by government officials, representatives of the 
Nemagon victims’ movement, affected sugar cane workers, and members of the 
landless campesinos movement after the protesters had spent 73 days marching and 
camping in front of the National Assembly. Among the provisions of the agreement, 
the affected banana and sugar cane workers were granted 80 visas to travel to the 
U.S. to provide testimony in their lawsuits, lifetime health care, inclusion of some 
17,000 former workers into existing social security and state pension programs, 
acceptance into the government-sponsored program Pound for Pound to provide 
basic foodstuffs, the establishment of environmental impact studies in communities 
potentially contaminated with agro-chemicals, the development of housing projects 
for landless and homeless movement members, and the provision of 300 coffins per 
year to bury those passing away from Nemagon-related illness. In exchange, the 
protesters were provided with free transportation back to their homes in Chinandega 
and Estelí. However, 300 protesters elected to stay behind to ensure that the newly 
signed agreement was enacted and to further pressure government officials who had 
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communicated with the lawyers representing the TNCs.173 Unlike the previous El 
Raizón Accords of 2004, with which the government failed to comply, the May 13 
agreement received formal institutional support from several international human 
rights organizations, such as CENIDH and the International Federation of Human 
Rights. Julio César Cruz, a former banana worker on the El Relámpago plantation, 
explained that he was pleased that such organizations were involved “because in 
this way they protect the struggle at the international level.”174 
 The May 13 agreement represented a huge victory for the victims of Nemagon 
exposure and initiated a deluge of progress in the movement. The first workers 
arrived in the United States in late July to begin providing witness statements to be 
used in the U.S. lawsuits against Dole, Dow, and Shell.175 Weeks later, the workers 
received news of another judicial victory in Nicaragua. Chinandegan Judge Socorro 
Toruño ruled in favor of 150 former banana workers in early August for damages 
resulting from DBCP exposure for a sum of $97 million.176 By the end of the month, 
the more than 15,000 workers involved in lawsuits against the fruit and chemical 
corporations were informed that the Ninth Circuit U.S. Federal Court of Appeals 
had issued a ruling in support of the initial December 11, 2002, Nicaraguan verdict 
in favor of 464 workers for $489.4 million. Though the ruling has been appealed 
and is still in court, Walter Gutiérrez assured workers that, “We are struggling to 
bring justice to our Nicaraguan brothers and so we will continue on until we have 
won all of the lawsuits in Nicaragua, and although the companies run from us, 
we will follow them to China or Africa if it is possible.”177 Finally, the National 
Assembly reaffirmed its support for the Nemagon victims in mid-September by 
passing a resolution re-asserting the constitutionality of Law 364.178 Satisfied with 
the successful implementation of the promised programs and the renewed support 
for Law 364, the remaining several hundred protesters camped in front of the 
National Assembly decided to return home on October 9, 2005.179 
 However, the workers’ struggle for a just compensation from the TNCs 
remains riddled with obstacles. In addition to having to overcome the improbability 
of winning a lawsuit against the massive TNCs that have promised “a vigorous 
defense” in court, the movement continues to struggle with crippling internal 
divisions.180 Since the negotiation of the May 13 agreement, Espinales has been 
criticized for everything from withholding the passports intended for plaintiffs 
testifying in the U.S. suits to stealing a 1995 Isuzu Rodeo, which he claims was 
given to him by U.S. lawyer Juan José Domínguez.181  Movement leaders made 
progress towards unification in late October by consolidating eight separate factions 
representing a total of 23,333 former workers under the leadership of various 
law firms, the Rural Workers Association (ATC), and other labor organizations. 
However, Espinales’ organization ASOTRAEXDAN was excluded from the 
unified body and accused of fraudulently attempting to represent the entirety of the 
Nemagon victims’ movement.182 Espinales has also been working with the Latin 
American Regional Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Tobacco, and 
Ethan Grundberg
124 Iowa Historical Review
Allied Workers Association (Rel-Uita, based in Montevideo, Uruguay) to found 
a new workers’ center scheduled to open in February 2006 to coordinate multi-
sector labor movements in Nicaragua and continue organizing victims of DBCP 
exposure.183
Conclusion
Although Dow and Shell were aware of the health risks posed by the 
nematicide as early as 1954, the Nicaraguan banana workers suffering from exposure 
to DBCP are still waging a battle for a just compensation from the TNCs. Their 
struggle has led them from the courtrooms of Nicaragua, to the streets of Managua, 
and finally to the U.S. in hopes of finding justice. Though internal divisions, legal 
expenses, and the enormous power of the TNCs threaten to undermine the workers’ 
hopes for victory, the Nicaraguan movement has rekindled a global movement for 
compensation from Dole, Dow, and Shell. Lawsuits against the fruit and chemical 
corporations have been filed in Ecuador, Venezuela,184 and Colombia185 for damages 
resulting from exposure to DBCP, and popular movements have re-emerged in 
Costa Rica demanding medical attention and compensation.186 The Nicaraguan 
workers now comprise just one of several independent national movements in Latin 
America fighting the same transnational targets. 
The success of the Nicaraguan movement in rallying behind a mix of popular 
nationalism and Sandinismo to pressure the government into action illustrates a 
viable alternative to popular conceptualizations of “globalization from below.” 
Rather than transnationalizing their struggle, the Nicaraguan workers effectively 
used the power of the spectacle to construct a highly visible and patriotic mobilization 
with popular resonance. In order to avoid losing even greater legitimacy in this age 
of small government and market supremacy, the National Assembly and President 
Bolaños were forced to support the movement and challenge the global agents 
of neo-liberalism. The movement’s success indicates that perhaps the nation-
state should still be considered a viable actor despite the confines of increasing 
transnationalism in the age of globalization.
Although the workers have returned home to Chinandega for the time being, 
their battle against the TNCs is far from over. None of the protesters seemed eager 
to return to Managua, but they all seemed ready to continue struggling until their 
death if necessary. As the protesters camped in front of the National Assembly have 
chanted many times over the years, “la lucha sigue”- the struggle continues.
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